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Casenote

Locke v. Davey: The Fine Line Between Free
Exercise and Establishment

In Locke v. Davey,' the United States Supreme Court held that a
state-sponsored scholarship program that excluded students who were
majoring in devotional theology did not violate the Free Exercise Clause
of the United States Constitution.2 The Court's holding left a great deal
of uncertainty on when states may withhold benefits on the basis of
religion.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1999 Washington State began offering the "Promise Scholarship"
to low and middle income students with superior academic records. The
scholarship was not available to students seeking theology degrees.
Joshua Davey was awarded a Promise Scholarship in the summer of
1999. He chose to attend a private Christian college. Davey decided to
pursue a double major in Pastoral Ministries and Efusiness Management.
Davey, a Christian, planned to seek a career in the "ministry."3 At the

1. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
2. Id. at 715; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S.
712 (2004). Students could receive the scholarship for up to two years. The amount of the
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beginning of Davey's first academic term, a university official informed
him that he could not use the scholarship to pursue a theology degree.
Davey learned that he would have to declare that he was not pursuing
a theology degree at the university in order to keep the scholarship.
Davey refused to make such a declaration, and therefore, did not receive
the scholarship money.4
Davey sued the State of Washington to stop the state from withholding scholarship funds from students pursuing theology degrees. Davey
argued that the state's policy violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment.5 The District Court for the Western District of
Washington granted summary judgment for the state. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, determining that
because the state had singled out religion for negative treatment, the
state's scholarship program would have to meet strict scrutiny. The
court of appeals also held the state's anti-establishment interests were
not compelling, and the scholarship program was unconstitutional. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 6
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." The
First Amendment was made applicable to state governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment.8
Colonists' concerns over restrictions on
religious liberty and persecution towards dissenters caused by government-sponsored churches provided the basis for the First Amendment. 9
Colonists hated taxes imposed to pay for ministers' salaries and for the
benefit of churches."0 Even before the Fourteenth Amendment applied

scholarship was $1125 for the first year and $1542 for the second year. To be eligible for
the scholarship, students had to graduate from a Washington high school, enroll in an
accredited college or university in Washington, and meet academic and income-level
requirements. Id. at 751-52.
4. Locke, 540 U.S. at 717.
5. Id. at 718; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 108 (1943)); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-11.
10. Id. at 11.
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the First Amendment to the states, many states included protection of
religious liberty in their constitutions.'
Washington State's constitution provides, "No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment
.... ,12 The Washington statute regarding qualifications for student
financial aid codified Washington's constitutional prohibition on public
funding of religious instruction. 13 That provision states, "No aid shall
4
be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology."
A. Cases Involving the Restriction of Activities on the Basis of
Religion
The Supreme Court has struggled to balance the Free Exercise Clause6
The Court in McDaniel v. Paty
with the Establishment Clause."
held that a Tennessee statute that barred ministers from being delegates
to the state's limited constitutional convention violated the Free Exercise
Clause. 7 The Court noted that ministers had a right to the free
exercise of religion and had a right to seek and hold elected offices and
delegate posts in Tennessee." Therefore, the clergy disqualification
provision kept McDaniel from being able to exercise his free exercise
right and his right to seek elected office simultaneously. 9

11. Id. at 13-14. For example, Georgia's Constitution of 1789 provided that "[aill
persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without being obliged to contribute to the
support of any religious profession but their own." GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5.
12.

WASH. CONST. art. I,

§

11.

Locke, 540 U.S. at 716; WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (2004) (recodified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 28B.92.100 (2004)).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 28B. 10.814 (2004) (recodified at WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.92. 100
13.

(2004)).
15. U.S. CONST. amend.
16. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).

I.

17. Id. at 629. The court noted that the provision had been maintained from
Tennessee's original Constitution and that it prevented clergymen from becoming
legislators. The provision was applied in 1977 when the state held a limited constitutional
convention. Id. at 621.
18. Id. at 626.
19. Id. Tennessee asserted an interest in avoiding the establishment of a state religion.
Id. at 628. The concern was that if ministers were allowed to hold public office they would
"exercise their powers and influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the
interests of another, thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the anti-establishment
principle with its command of neutrality." Id. at 628-29. The Court dismissed this
rationale by stating it was not supported by the "American experience" and that there was
no reason to believe that ministers would be less careful than others in protecting antiestablishment interests. Id. at 629.
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The Court has not limited its protection of the free exercise of religion
to situations where individuals must choose between exercising different
rights. In Widmar v. Vincent,2" the Court held that a state university
could not exclude student groups wishing to use its facilities for religious
activities when the facilities were otherwise generally available to
student groups.2 ' The Court applied strict scrutiny because it determined the state was regulating speech on the basis of content.2" The
Court determined that the state's interest in providing a greater
separation of church and state than provided for in the United States
Constitution was not "sufficiently 'compelling' to justify content-based
discrimination against respondents' religious speech." 3
The Court has also protected religious groups from laws that prohibit
specific religious activities. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
24
City of Hialeah,
the Court held that a series of city ordinances that
forbade religious animal sacrifices was unconstitutional.2 5 The Church
of the Lukumi ("Lukumi") was devoted to the Santeria religion and
planned to open a church in Hialeah. Animal sacrifice was a part of the
Santeria rituals. City leaders became concerned and enacted ordinances
that made the type of sacrifices the church performed illegal.2" The
Court concluded that the laws were not neutral and "had as their object
the suppression of religion."" The Court reached this decision because
the laws: (1) evidenced animosity toward the practitioners of Santeria;
(2) were crafted to forbid the sacrifices while allowing most secular
killings of animals; and (3) prohibited more conduct than was necessary
to meet their asserted ends. The Court also determined that the laws
were not of general applicability because the state pursued its alleged
ends by strictly going against religious conduct. 29 Thus, because the
law was neither neutral nor of general applicability, the Court deter-

20. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
21. Id. at 277. The university claimed that it could not make the facilities available
to religious groups without violating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 270-71. The Court
acknowledged that the religious groups might get some incidental benefits from having
access to the facilities, but that incidental benefits did not mean advancement of religion.
Id. at 273.
22. Id. at 276.
23. Id.
24. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
25. Id. at 527-28, 546-47.
26. Id. at 525-28. The church, and its leader Pichardo, sued the city and the city
council, alleging violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 528. The district court and
the court of appeals upheld the laws. Id. at 530.27. Id. at 542.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 545-46.

2005]

LOCKE V. DAVEY

1097

mined that strict scrutiny applied. 30 The Court held that the city's
interests were not compelling and that the laws were not narrowly
tailored to meet those interests.3 1
B.

Cases Involving Government Benefits

In Everson v. Board of Education,32 the Court held that there was no
First Amendment violation when a township provided reimbursements
for transportation expenses incurred by students, including students
attending Catholic schools.33 The Court noted that while New Jersey
could not directly give money to religious institutions without violating
the Establishment Clause, it could not interfere with the free exercise of
religion either.3 4 The Court asserted that the state is to be neutral
with regard to religious groups, and "[sitate power is no more to be used
The Court
so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them."30
acknowledged that some parents might have been unable to send their
children to parochial schools without reimbursement for transportation.3 6 However, the Court noted the possibility of a similar effect, of
parents not sending their children to parochial schools, if state paid
police did not protect parochial school students from traffic hazards, or
if the state did not provide services such as fire protection, sewage
disposal, and public services to those schools.37 The Court held that
there was no breach of the First Amendment, reasoning that the state
neither gave money to nor supported parochial schools. 38 Rather, the

30. Id. at 546.
31. Id. at 546-47. To be consistent with the First Amendment, the laws had to serve
compelling interests and be narrowly tailored to meet those interests. Id. at 546. The
Court held that the ordinances were invalid because each of the ordinances was either
underinclusive or overbroad and that "[t]he proferred objectives [were] not pursued with
respect to analgous non-religious conduct, and those interests could be achieved by
narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree." Id. The Court also
held that the ordinances were not supported by compelling interests because "[w]here
government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact
feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of
the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling." Id.
at 546-47.
32. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
33. Id. at 3, 18.
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id. at 17.
37. Id. at 17-18.
38. Id. at 18.
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program merely aided parents in getting their children to and from
accredited schools, regardless of the religion involved.39
The Court has also considered programs that have the effect of
benefiting religious organizations. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New
York, 4 ° the Court determined that New York's policy of providing tax
exemptions to religious organizations did not violate the First Amendment.4 In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the purpose of
the First Amendment's religion clauses was to "insure that no religion
be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited."4 2 The
Court stated that its general principle in dealing with the First
Amendment had been to forbid the government from establishing or
interfering with religion.43 The Court added that, "[sihort of those
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without ponsorship and without interference.""
In considering tax exemRtions, the Court noted that historically those
individuals writing constitutions and statutes had been wary of the
dangers involved in imposing property taxes, and that exemption was a
way of preventing those dangers.45 The Court concluded that New
York did not establish religion by providing the exemption; rather, New
York spared religious institutions from the tax burden faced by for-profit
organizations. 46 The Court said that, without exemption, the state
would become more involved with the religious institutions through, for
example, tax valuations. 47 The Court noted that the potential dangers
of churches supporting government were no less than the dangers of the
government supporting churches and that "each relationship carries4
some involvement rather than the desired insulation and separation."
While the Court has allowed some programs that have the effect of
benefiting religious groups and their followers, the Court has not
required states to make such benefits available in all situations. In
Johnson v. Robison,49 the Court held that a federal policy that disqualified conscientious objectors who performed alternative service from

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 680.
Id. at 669.
Id.

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 673.
Id.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 675.
415 U.S. 361 (1974).

20051

LOCKE V. DAVEY

1099

receiving veterans' educational benefits was constitutional.5" Robison
completed two years of alternative service because he was a conscientious objector for religious reasons: He later filed for educational
benefits and those benefits were denied. He then sued, claiming that the
decision violated his First Amendment rights.5" The Court applied the
rational basis scrutiny test because Robison was not part of a suspect
5
The
class nor did the government violate his free exercise rightsY.
Court asserted that any burden on the free exercise of religion was
incidental.5 3 Additionally, the Court determined that the rational basis
test was met because there was a distinction between military veterans
and persons completing alternative service.54
The Court has not allowed states to withhold benefits in cases where
individuals would have to violate their religious convictions in order to
receive the benefits. In Thomas v. Review Board of IndianaEmployment
Security Division,5" the Court held that the state violated the free
exercise rights of an adherent to the Jehovah's Witness faith when it
denied him unemployment compensation after he quit his job because
his religious beliefs did not allow him to work in a position that involved
producing armaments.5 " In reversing the Indiana Supreme Court
decision to allow the denial of benefits to Thomas, the Court noted that
[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby

50. Id. at 362-64, 385-86.
51. Id. at 364.
52. Id. at 375 n.14.
53. Id. at 385.
54. Id. at 381-82. Military service was a much longer disruption than civilian service
to the lives of those involved. Military veterans had to serve for six years, while the
alternative service only lasted for two years. Id. at 378. Additionally, military veterans
suffered "a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers." Id. at 379.
The Court also noted that the classification was rationally related to the government's
objective of making military service more attractive. Id. at 382. The Court concluded that
"[aippellee and his class were not included in this class of beneficiaries, not because of any
legislative design to interfere with free exercise of religion, but because to do so would not
rationally promote the Act's purposes." Id. at 385.
55. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
56. Id. at 709, 720. When the plant where Thomas was working closed, he was sent
to a department that worked in producing military armaments. Thomas quit because his
religious beliefs did not permit him to do such work. He then applied for unemployment
benefits from the state. Indiana determined that Thomas did not leave for "good cause,"
as Indiana law required, and thus, denied benefits to Thomas. Id. at 710-12.
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putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and
to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists."
The Court then applied strict scrutiny to the Indiana law." The Court
determined that the state's interest in preventing the burden on funding
that would occur if people were allowed to receive benefits after leaving
jobs for "personal reasons" and in avoiding employers examination of job
applicants' religious beliefs were not sufficient to justify the burden on
free exercise of religion. 59
The Court has allowed the states some discretion in their administration of benefits. In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for
the Blind, ° the Court held that providing aid to finance a blind
student's education for the ministry would not advance religion in a way
that would violate the Establishment Clause.6
The Washington
Supreme Court held that the state could not provide aid to the student
because of the Establishment Clause. The Washington court reasoned
that providing such aid to a student preparing for the ministry would
have the primary effect of advancing religion. 2 The Supreme Court
disagreed with the Washington Supreme Court and stated that "the
Establishment Clause is not violated every time money previously in the
possession of a State is conveyed to a religious institution."" By way
of example, the Court noted that some state employees might choose to
donate parts of their paychecks to religious institutions without violating
the Constitution.6 4 The Court also noted that the state program did not
provide greater benefits to those applying their aid to religious
education; rather, recipients could choose from a full range of secular
education opportunities.6 5 The Court determined that the petitioner's
decision to use state aid to pay for his religious education did not "confer
any message of state endorsement of religion." 6

57. Id. at 717-18.
58. Id. at 718.
59. Id. at 718-19.
60. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
61. Id. at 489. The Court noted that Washington was still free to consider its case
under the Washington State Constitution, which provided stricter guidelines. Id. The
Washington Supreme Court later considered the case again and denied aid based on the
Washington Constitution. Witters v. Washington, 711 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash. 1989).
62. Witters, 474 U.S. at 485.
63. Id. at 486.
64. Id. at 486-87.
65. Id. at 488.
66. Id. at 488-89.
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67
Additionally, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
the Court held that an
Ohio program that provided financial assistance for students to attend
public or private schools that met certain geographic, academic, and
nondiscrimination requirements was constitutional."8 The Supreme
Court noted that because the program had a valid secular purpose, the
question they had to determine was whether the law had the "forbidden
'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion."69 The Court held that the
program did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was a
program of true private choice. 0 The Court reasoned that

the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It
provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined
only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It
permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options
public and private, secular and religious.7"
Therefore, because the program did not advance religion, the Court once
again allowed state discretion in deciding how to administer the
benefit. v2
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

3

In Locke v. Davey, the Court said that Washington's alleged
disfavor of religion was milder than that found in previous cases. 4 The
Court distinguished the state's scholarship program from Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah5 by noting that under
Washington's scholarship program, no criminal or civil sanctions were
imposed on religious conduct.7 8 The Court also noted that the program
did not exclude ministers from participation in political activities as

67. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
68. Id. at 645-46, 662-63. The program was designed to allow parents to make
educational choices. The program was open to religious or nonreligious private schools that
met certain qualifications. Id. at 645-46. A group of taxpayers sued on various grounds; the
court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding in favor of the taxpayers. Id. at 648.
The court of appeals held that the program violated the Establishment Clause by
advancing religion. Id.
69. Id. at 649.
70. Id. at 662-63.
71. Id. at 662.
72. Id. at 662-63.
73. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
74. Id. at 720.
75. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
76. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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happened in McDaniel v. Paty.7 Additionally, the program, unlike the
benefit scheme in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment
Security Division,7 did not require students to choose between receiving the scholarship and following their religious beliefs.79 The Court
stated that Washington merely chose not to fund a particular type of
instruction. 0
The Court discussed the historical basis of Washington's interest in
preventing establishment of religion."1 The Court noted that both the
"United States and state constitutions embody distinct views-in favor
of free exercise, but opposed to establishment-that find no counterpart
with respect to other callings or professions." 2 Therefore, the Court
asserted that Washington's distinction between religion and other
professions was due to concerns over avoiding establishment rather than
hostility towards religion.83
Along the same lines, the Court cited a number of examples of early
state constitutions that contained provisions that prohibited the use of
public funds for the ministry.8 4 The majority supported its conclusion
that religious instruction was different from other callings by noting that
some early state constitutions excluded only the ministry from receiving
public funds.8 5
The Court also asserted that the absence of hostility toward religion
in the Washington program was apparent in the fact that religion was
included in its benefits.8 8 Indeed, the Court noted that the scholarship
allowed students to take devotional theology courses at religious
schools.8 7
Due to the apparent lack of animus toward religion and the state's
interest in avoiding establishment of religion, the Court determined that
the scholarship program was not "inherently constitutionally suspect.""
The Court concluded that the state had a substantial interest in not

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

438 U.S. 618 (1978); Locke, 540 U.S. at 720.
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Locke, 540 U.S. at 720-21.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 725.
Id.
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funding education for the ministry and that withholding the funds
placed only a minor burden on the students.8 9
Scalia Dissent (joined by Thomas)
In his dissent Justice Scalia contended that the Court should have
used strict scrutiny because the law facially discriminated against
religion.9 ° In reaching that conclusion, Scalia cited Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. and noted that the majority and concurring
opinions in that case supported his contention.91
Scalia argued that the decision should have been based on the
B.

principle articulated in Everson v. Board of Education,92 namely that

states cannot withhold public benefits solely on the basis of religion. 93
Scalia stated that when a state provides benefits that are generally
available, that state violates the Free Exercise Clause when it withholds
those benefits solely because of religion, "no less than if it had imposed
a special tax."94 Scalia contended that Washington had done exactly
that by excluding only one course of study: theology. 5
Scalia answered the majority's reference to the nation's history of
disfavor toward the funding of the clergy. 6 Scalia distinguished the
earlier laws from the Washington law; the earlier laws that were
disfavored were laws that gave preferential treatment to ministers.97
The Washington law, Scalia contended, merely involved the inclusion of
ministerial students in public benefit programs.9" Scalia added:
One can concede the Framers' hostility to funding the clergy specifically, but that says nothing about whether the clergy had to be excluded
from benefits the State made available to all. No one would seriously
contend, for example, that the Framers would have barred ministers
from using public roads on their way to church.99
Scalia argued that the Court did not defer to an Establishment Clause
violation or budget constraints; it deferred to "pure philosophical

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 726 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Locke, 540 U.S. at 726-27 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 727 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 727-28 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 727-28 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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preference: the State's opinion that it would violate taxpayers' freedom
of conscience not to discriminate against candidates for the ministry."' 0 Scalia added that this argument could lead to discrimination
10
against religion in relation to almost any type of public program.
Scalia criticized the majority for authorizing facial discrimination by
referring to the lightness of the burden on Davey. °2 Scalia said that
no harm should be considered insubstantial when someone has been
singled out on the basis of that person's religious calling. °3 Scalia also
criticized the majority's conclusion that the scholarship program was not
inspired by animus against religion.0 4 He noted that when a state
denies an individual a right, such as the right to a trial by jury, there is
no need to look at whether that state was trying to accomplish that evil,
rather, "[ilt is sufficient that the citizen's rights have been infringed." °5
Scalia concluded by speculating on possible extensions of the court's
holding. 0 6 He posited one hypothetical of the government denying
priests and nuns prescription drug benefits because it offends taxpayers
to support the clergy at public expense.0 7 Scalia predicted that
"[w]hen the public's freedom of conscience is invoked to justify denial of
equal treatment, benevolent motives shade into indifference and
ultimately into repression."'
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court, with its holding in Locke v. Davey,"°9 changed the way in
which states can deal with benefit distribution in relation to religion.
The Court will apparently not find an infringement of the Free Exercise
Clause,"0 and thus, will not use strict scrutiny when programs are:
(1) not motivated by animosity towards religion; and (2) do not require
a choice between fulfilling religious obligations and receipt of the benefit.
The Court's holding, however, stopped far short of establishing a clear
test for when states may withhold benefits on the basis of religion.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 730 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 731 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 732 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 734 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Animosity Towards Religion

The Court seemed to place particular importance on the fact that
although the Washington scholarship program was not facially neutral,
there was no animus toward religion on the part of the state."' It can
be inferred that the result might have been different if there had been
evidence of hostility towards religion. Such evidence might have been
found if there had been criminal or civil sanctions for religious activihad "merely chosen not to fund a
ty."2 The Court said Washington
3
instruction.""1
of
category
This distinction could be quite troubling in dealing with future cases.
Proving hostility towards religion will be quite difficult in many cases.
Any state or government could easily run to the historical concern over
avoiding establishment of religion, regardless of its actual reason for
denying benefits. States could conceivably reach the type of result that
Scalia feared: "What next? Will we deny priests and nuns their
prescription-drug benefits on the ground that taxpayers' freedom of
conscience forbids medicating the clergy at public expense?""14 The
only defense against such results, absent evidence of animus towards
religion, is through the second way the Court could reach strict scrutiny:
when a law forces people of a given faith to choose between following
their religion and receiving a government benefit.
B.

Choosing Between Religion and Receiving Benefits

The Court also seemed to indicate that another case in which it would
apply strict scrutiny would be if individuals had to choose between
following their religion and receiving benefits." 5 Based on the reasoning from Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division,"6 such a choice would represent a burden on free exercise
rights." 7 The Court claimed there was no such choice required in
Washington's scholarship program."' However, one can easily foresee
cases where students will say that they will not be true to their religion
if they do not pursue a career in the ministry. Therefore, assuming they
do not have independent means to pay for school, they will either have

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
See id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 734 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
See Locke, 540 U.S. at 720-21.
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Id. at 717-18.
Locke, 540 U.S. at 720-21.
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to choose between following their religious calling or receiving scholarship aid; they will not be able to do both. Students may argue that
having to work in any field other than the ministry would represent a
violation of their religious beliefs. On the other hand, states will argue
that they are not causing the students to choose between engaging in
offensive conduct and receiving benefits, as was the case in Thomas." 9
Rather, the states will argue that they are refusing to sponsor the
students' affirmative steps to follow their religious beliefs.
Scalia's hypothetical situation in which a government refuses to
provide prescription drug benefits to clergy members 12 ° is an excellent
example of the conflict here. A government may argue that it does not
want to establish religion by extending benefits to clergy members. The
government will also contend that it is not proscribing religious conduct,
it is merely refusing to support religious endeavors. Members of the
clergy will likely respond by saying that if they do not have prescription
drug benefits, they will be unable to follow their calling. Therefore, they
will be forced to work in a secular job and thereby violate their religion.
Is this different from the choice that was present in Thomas, when
Thomas had to choose between doing offensive work and receiving
benefits?12 '
C.

The Broader Ramifications of Locke

The consequences of the Court's holding will likely be limited to
questions of whether states can exclude individuals from benefits on the
basis of religion. The Court in no way endorsed laws that would directly
prohibit specific religious conduct or that would have no other purpose
than to burden religious activities. The Court's holding does not prohibit
states from providing scholarships to theology students; it merely allows
states to refuse funding if they have a reasonable purpose for doing so.
Nothing in the Court's reasoning indicates that providing funding to
theology students in scholarship programs similar to Washington's would
violate the Establishment Clause. 122 Nevertheless, many states may
choose to follow Washington's lead and refuse funding to theology
students in programs that are similar to Washington State's scholarship
program. States now know they can refuse funding based on the
guidelines set forth by the Court.

119. 450 U.S. at 717-18.
120. Locke, 540 U.S. at 734 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
121. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710, 717-18.
122. In fact the Court has already held that a similar program was constitutionally
permissible. See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986).
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While it is likely that the Court will apply its holding to a fairly
narrow set of circumstances, states may interpret the holding in very
different ways. Conceivably, the holding could extend much further than
benefit programs like the one the Court addressed in Locke."2 For
example a state could decide to refuse to provide public services such as
fire protection to churches. The state could argue that the purpose of
the exclusion was to avoid establishment rather than to suppress
religion. The state could make this argument even if the movement
were secretly led by an anti-religious group that wanted to force
churches to close down. The state would only have to suppress evidence
of animus towards religion. The state could also argue that the law does
not force individuals to choose between being faithful to their religion
and enjoying the benefits of public fire protection. They would contend
that individuals are still free to carry out their religion in their homes.
Furthermore, individuals could still attend religious services if they like;
the only difference is that the state would not support that endeavor by
providing public services. The church groups would respond by asserting
that the law does require a choice; most organized religions emphasize
the importance of regular church attendance. Without regular church
attendance, church members would be left with a choice between
attending worship services, as required by their faith, and enjoying the
benefit of public fire protection.
While such doomsday scenarios are barely within the realm of
possibility, a more likely battleground will be school voucher programs
that provide vouchers for students to attend private religious
schools.' 24 States can now exclude students desiring to use vouchers
to attend religious schools, as long as there is no evidence of animus
towards religion. In those states parents desiring to use vouchers to
send their children to private schools will have to argue that the
exclusion causes them to make a choice between raising their children
as required by their religion and receiving the voucher. Parents will
have to argue that attending a nonparochial school will expose their
children to content and activities that will be offensive to their religion.
However, it is not clear what will be required to reach the level of a
choice that will be constitutionally offensive.

123. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715-17.
124. See Brian C. Anderson, Soundings: "If Not Vouchers?," MANHATTAN INST. (DBA)
CITY J., Spring 2004, at 8-9. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,536 U.S. 639 (2002), the Court
held that voucher programs that provide for a true private choice between secular and
religious schools do not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 662-63. See discussion
supra notes 67-72. Future cases will likely address programs that exclude, rather than
include, students desiring to use vouchers to attend religious schools.
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It is difficult to predict what impact the Court's holding will have.
the
However, the holding is not likely to bring an end to conflicts over
125
future.
near
the
in
religion
of
basis
the
on
benefits
of
exclusion
BRETT THOMPSON

125. It is worth noting that Joshua Davey's story has a happy, albeit ironic ending.
Davey majored in religion and philosophy in undergraduate school but ended up attending
Harvard Law School instead of pursuing a career in the ministry. Davey decided that the
law was another way to live his faith. Beth Hanson, Losing Before High Court Part of
Journey for Davey, RECORDER, July 6, 2004, at 3.

